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ABSTRACT 
Nowadays, we can easily obtain variety of services through networks. But due to the open environment, networks are 
vulnerable to many security threats. The remote user authentication scheme is one of the most widely used 
mechanisms for servers to authorize users to access the services.  In 2009, Ramasamy and Muniyandi proposed a 
discrete logarithm based remote authentication scheme with smart cards. Their scheme provides mutual 
authentication and withstands the denial of service attack, forgery attack and parallel session attack. In this article, we 
show that their scheme is not a practical solution for remote access. It lacks key agreement mechanism and users 
cannot choose or update passwords freely. Moreover, their scheme cannot resist the stolen-verifier attack, off-line 
guessing attack, impersonation attack and smart-card-loss-attack. We propose an improved scheme to remedy the 
drawbacks. The improved scheme has the merits of providing mutual authentication and key agreement, while 
forward and backward secrecy are ensured as well. The users can choose and update their passwords freely. 
Furthermore, the scheme can also withstand many attacks such as the smart-card-loss-attack, the replay attack, the 
off-line guessing attack, the insider attack, the impersonation attack and the parallel session attack. 
 
Keywords: Remote authentication, smart cards, discrete logarithm problem. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Network is one of the best platforms for people to 
obtain variety of online services. However, due to 
the open environment, many network systems are 
vulnerable to lots of attack. The remote user 
authentication scheme is one of the most 
convenient and widely used authentication 
mechanisms for servers to identify users over 
insecure communication channels [1-8]. In the 
remote user authentication scheme, the remote 
users access to the system for services after they 
are authenticated. A remote user authentication 
scheme comprises users, servers and insecure 
communication channels. Thus the security and 
vulnerabilities of the remote user authentication 
scheme depend on these three components [9]. 
An adversary or even the legitimate user can 
launch variety of attacks such as the guessing 
attack, replay attack, impersonation attack, insider 
attack, etc. on the system. An attacker can  
 
 
intercept the transmitted information in secure or 
insecure channel and then use the intercepted 
information to attack the system. 
 
Since smart card is one of the most reliable and 
efficient tools for authentication, there are many 
remote user authentication schemes identify the 
users by using smart cards [1, 3, 6, 7, 9-13]. 
Lamport [14] proposed the first well-known 
remote password authentication scheme in 
1981. But the scheme has the drawbacks of high 
hash overhead and the server does not need to 
store a password verification table. Chien et al. 
[10] proposed a user authentication scheme in 
2002. But Ku and Chen [12] showed that the 
scheme is vulnerable to the reflection attack and 
the insider attack. Ku and Chen proposed an 
enhancement to solve the problems. Their 
scheme has the merits of mutual authentication, 
  
ImprovementoftheElGamalBasedRemoteAuthenticationSchemeUsingSmartCards, YungͲChengLeeetal./1063Ͳ1072
Vol.12,December20141064
no verification table and resisting the parallel 
session attack. Later, Yoon et al. [7] indicated 
that Ku and Chen's improved scheme was also 
susceptible to the parallel session attack, and 
then they proposed an improved scheme to fix 
the flaws. However, in 2009, Hsiang and Shin 
[11] showed that Yoon et al.’s improved scheme 
is vulnerable to the parallel session attack, 
masquerading attack and password guessing 
attack. They also proposed an improved scheme 
to remedy the drawbacks. 
 
Hwang and Li [15], based on the ElGamal’s [16] 
public key scheme, proposed a remote user 
authentication scheme with smart cards in 2000. 
The scheme withstands the replay attack and the 
server does not need to maintain a password 
table for verifying the legitimacy of the login 
users. The security of the scheme relies on the 
difficulty of solving discrete logarithms problem. 
But Chan and Cheng [17] indicated that the 
scheme is insecure since a legal user can 
generate a valid pair of identity and password 
without knowing the server's secret key. Shen et 
al. [18] also shown that the Hwang and Li's 
scheme is vulnerable to the masquerade attack, 
and then proposed a modified scheme to fix the 
drawback. Shen et al.'s scheme prevents the 
masquerade attack by hiding user's identity. 
However, Leung et al. [19] shown that Shen et 
al.'s scheme also cannot resist the 
impersonation attack. Awasthi and Lal [20] 
proposed a modified scheme to enhance the 
security of Hwang-Li’s scheme. Awasthi and Lal 
declared that any attacker cannot obtain the 
passwords corresponding to the previously 
registered identities with the revealed secret key. 
But Kumar [9] indicated that Awasthi and Lal’s 
scheme does not provide forward security to the 
authentication server. 
 
Yoon et al. [21] based on generalized ElGamal 
signature scheme proposed a smart card remote 
user authentication scheme. The scheme provides 
mutual authentication and session key agreement; 
the user can choose and update his password 
freely without the assistance of the server. 
However, Tian et al. [22] indicated that Yoon et 
al.’s scheme does not provide two-factor security. 
Two-factor security means a system can 
guarantee the security of the scheme when either 
the user’s smart card or his password is stolen, but 
not both. Tian et al. shown that if an attacker 
obtains the secret in the smart card, he can forge 
user's valid login request without knowing the 
user’s password. Tian et al. also propose two more 
efficient smart card remote user authentication 
schemes to remedy the flaws. 
 
Ramasamy and Muniyandi [13], based on ElGamal 
cryptosystem, proposed a remote authentication 
scheme with smart card in 2009. Their scheme 
provides mutual authentication and withstands the 
denial of service attack, forgery attack and parallel 
session attack. In this paper, we will show that 
their scheme has the following weaknesses: (1) It 
cannot withstand the stolen-verifier attack; (2) It 
lacks key agreement mechanism; (3) Users cannot 
choose and update their passwords freely; (4) The 
scheme is not a practical solution for remote 
authentication due to the long bit-length password 
which is difficult to memorize; (5) It is vulnerable to 
the off-line guessing attack if password is small. (6) 
It cannot resist the impersonation attack. (7) It 
cannot resist the smart-card-loss-attack. 
 
We propose an improved scheme to remedy the 
drawbacks. The improved scheme has the merits of 
providing mutual authentication and ensures forward 
and backward secrecy. It can also withstand variety 
of attacks such as the smart-card-loss-attack, the 
replay attack, the off-line guessing attack, the insider 
attack, the impersonation attack and the parallel 
session attack. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. All 
notations used throughout this article are 
described in Section 2. Ramasamy and 
Muniyandi's scheme and its weakness are briefly 
described in Section 3. Our improved scheme and 
its security analysis along with performance 
discussion are presented in Section 4. Finally, we 
make conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. Preliminaries and notations 
 
Generally, a smart card based remote user 
authentication scheme comprises the following five 
phases: (1) the registration phase, (2) the login 
phase, (3) the authentication phase, (4) the key 
agreement phase and (5) the password changing 
phase. In the registration phase, the user sends a 
registration request along with related information 
to the server via a secure channel. The server 
 ImprovementoftheElGamalBasedRemoteAuthenticationSchemeUsingSmartCards, YungͲChengLeeetal./1063Ͳ1072
JournalofAppliedResearchandTechnology 1065
identifies the user and generates related 
messages to store in the smart card, and then 
delivers the card to the user. In the login phase, 
the user attaches his smart card into a card 
reader and keys in password to login to the 
system. In the authentication phase, the server 
checks the validity of the login request. If the user 
is authenticated, the server allows the user to 
access the system online. In the key agreement 
phase, the user and the server cooperatively 
negotiate a common session key for future secure 
communication. In the password changing phase, 
remote users freely update their passwords. The 
mutual authentication refers to users 
authenticating themselves to a server and that 
server authenticating itself to the user in such a 
way that both parties are assured of the others' 
identity. Many remote authentication schemes 
provide mutual authentication feature to enhance 
the security. 
 
If the user wants to join the authentication system, 
he should register himself to the server. When a 
user wants to obtain services, he has to login to 
the system. The server authorizes the user to 
access the system after he is authenticated. All 
notations used in this paper are listed in Table 1. 
 
Notations Description 
iU   
iID  
iPW   
AS  
Sx  
r  
p  
SK  
 
)(h   
T   
䎩   
  
}{: MBA䋻   
 
}{: MBA䊻  
A legitimate user.  
The identity of the user iU .  
The password of the user iU .   
The authentication server.  
The server's secret key. 
A random number. 
A large prime number. 
The common session key for the 
server and user.  
A secure one-way hash function.   
A timestamp.   
Bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) operation. 
The concatenation operation.  
The entity A sends message M to 
the receiver B via a secure channel.  
The entity A sends message M to 
the receiver B through a public 
channel. 
 
Table 1. The notations. 
 
3. Ramasamy and Muniyandi’s remote mutual 
authentication scheme using smart cards 
 
Ramasamy and Muniyandi proposed an ElGamal 
based remote authentication scheme with smart 
card in 2009 [13]. The security of the scheme 
depends on solving the discrete-logarithm 
problem. The scheme comprises the registration 
phase, the login phase and the authentication 
phase. The scheme and its weaknesses are 
described in Section 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. 
 
3.1 Ramasamy and Muniyandi's scheme 
 
(1) The registration phase 
 
If a user iU  wants to join the system, the steps of 
the registration phase are as follows. 
 
Step R-1. }requestonRegistrati,{: ii IDASU 䋻  
 
The user submits iID  along with the registration 
request to the server in person or through a 
secure channel.  
 
Step R-2. }cardSmart,{: ii PWUAS䋻   
 
Upon receiving iID  and the registration request, 
the authentication server AS computes the 
password iPW  for iU  by:  
 
pTIDPW SxRii mod)(= 䎩                                   (1) 
 
Where RT  is the registration timestamp and Sx  is 
the server's secret key. The AS installs 
}),(,{ phPWi   into a smart card and sends it along 
with the password iPW  to the user through a 
secure channel.  
 
(2) The login phase 
 
If a user wants to access the system for 
services, he should login to the system. The 
steps of the login phase are as follows. 
 
Step L-1. The user keys in iID  and iPW . 
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The user iU  attaches the smart card to a card 
reader and keys in his iID  and iPW .  
 
Step L-2. },,,{: 21 TCCIDASU ii 䊻 .  
 
The smart card generates a random number r and 
computes },,,{ 211 CMtC  by: 
 
pPWC ri mod=1                                                  (2) 
 
)1mod()(=1 -䎩 pPWTht i                                   (3) 
 
pPWM ti mod= 1                                                 (4) 
 
pCMC t mod)(×= 112                                           (5) 
 
Where T is the current timestamp. Next, the user 
sends },,,{ 21 TCCIDi  to the server.  
 
(3) The authentication phase 
 
In the authentication phase, the server and the 
user check the received information to authenticate 
each other. The steps of the authentication phase 
are as follows. 
 
Step A-1. The server checks iID  and T. 
 
On receiving },,,{ 21 TCCIDi , the server checks the 
identity iID  and the timestamp T. The steps 
continued if iID  is existed in the verification table 
and T is in a valid time interval; otherwise, the login 
steps are terminated.  
 
Step A-2. The server authenticates the user. 
 
If iID  and T are valid, the server computes 
Sx
Rii TIDPW )( 䎩  and )1(mod)(=1 -䎩 pPWTht i . 
Next, the server checks whether the following 
equation holds. 
 
pPWCC ti
t mod)(=)( 11 112
-                                    (6) 
 
The user is authenticated if above equation is 
satisfied. 
 
Step A-3. },{: 3 Si TCUAS 䊻 . 
 
After the user is authenticated, the authentication 
server computes 2t  and 3C  by: 
 
)1mod()(=2 -䎩 pPWTht iS                                  (7) 
 
pCC t mod213                                                    (8) 
 
Where ST  is the current timestamp. Then, the 
server sends },{ 3 STC  to the user. 
 
Step A-4. The user authenticates the server. 
 
After receiving },{ 3 STC , the user checks the 
freshness of the timestamp ST . If ST  is in a valid 
time interval, the user computes )(='2 iS PWTht 䎩   
)1mod( -p  and '13 2='
tCC . Then the user checks 
whether '3C  is equal to 3C . The server is 
authenticated by the user if '33 CC  .  
 
3.2-The weaknesses of Ramasamy and 
Muniyandi's scheme 
 
Though Ramasamy and Muniyandi's scheme 
provides mutual authentication and withstands the 
denial of service attack, forgery attack and parallel 
session attack. However, their scheme contains 
weaknesses as follows. 
 
(1) The users cannot update their password freely 
 
In general, for  the security of a remote 
password authentication scheme, it is necessary 
to update password frequently. However, in 
Ramasamy and Muniyandi's scheme, due to the 
password is computed by the server with 
Sx
Rii TIDPW )( 䎩 , the user should repeat the 
registration steps if he wants to update his 
password. That is, the user should register 
himself again to the authentication server 
through secure channel. This makes the scheme 
is inconvenient for users on updating passwords. 
Moreover, due to the password is computed only 
by the server, it will cause lots of disputes if the 
password is disclosed. 
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(2) It is not a practical solution for authentication 
if the bit-length of password is quite long 
 
In Ramasamy and Muniyandi's scheme, it is a 
discrete logarithm problem to find Sx  because the 
password is computed by the authentication server 
with )(mod)(= pTIDPW SxRii 䎩 , where p is a large 
prime. The large prime will cause long bit-length 
password. However, the long bit-length of password 
is difficult to be memorized. This makes it is not easy 
for users to key in password for login. Thus the 
scheme is not a practical solution for authentication. 
 
(3) It is vulnerable to the off-line guessing attack if 
the password is small 
 
On the contrary, for the ease of memorizing, we 
always choose a small password. However, the 
scheme is vulnerable to the off-line guessing 
attack if the password is small. The steps of the 
off-line guessing attack are as follows. 
 
Step.G-1. The adversary intercepts },,,{ 21 TCCIDi  
from Step L-2.  
 
Step G-2. The adversary guesses the password. 
 
In this step, the adversary tries to guess the 
password. Suppose he tries to guess 'iPW  is the 
correct password. Then the adversary computes 
1)'(
12 )( -䎩 iPWThCCD  and )'()'(=' iPWThiPWD 䎩  with 
the intercepted information },,,{ 21 TCCIDi  and 
'iPW . Then the adversary checks whether the 
equation '= DD  holds; the guessing steps are 
repeated if it isn’t. The correct password is obtained 
if '= DD . The password will be found easily if its bit-
length is not long enough. So Ramasamy and 
Muniyandi's scheme is vulnerable to the off-line 
guessing attack if the password is small. 
 
Similarly, due to )(113 == 2 iS
PWTht CCC 䎩 , the 
adversary also can use the information },{ 3 STC  in 
Step A-3 to guess the password.  
 
(4) It cannot resist the impersonation attack 
 
With the off-line guessing attack described above, 
an adversary will obtain the password iPW . With  
 
iPW , the adversary can compute },,,{ 21 TCCIDi  
by Eq.[2-5]. With },,,{ 21 TCCIDi , an adversary can 
impersonate a legitimate user to login to the system. 
Similarly, an adversary can also compute correct 
information },{ 3 STC  in Step A-3 for authentication. 
Thus Ramasamy and Muniyandi's scheme is 
vulnerable to the impersonation attack. 
 
(5) It lacks key agreement mechanism 
 
The key agreement mechanism provides users 
and server to negotiate a common session key; 
thereafter users and server can communicate 
securely with the session key. Generally, a remote 
authentication scheme should provide user and 
server a key agreement protocol to establish a 
common session key after authentication is 
obtained. However, Ramasamy and Muniyandi's 
scheme lacks key agreement mechanism which 
makes it is inconvenient to use. 
 
(6) It cannot resist the stolen-verifier attack 
 
In Ramasamy and Muniyandi's scheme, the server 
stores },,{ RiS TIDx  in the verification table. The 
server should properly protect the verification table 
to avoid secret information being disclosed. 
However, the existence of the verification table will 
cause the adversary intends to steal the secret 
information for benefits. If an adversary obtains 
},,{ RiS TIDx , he can impersonate as the legitimate 
user to login the system. Thus Ramasamy and 
Muniyandi's scheme is also vulnerable to the 
stolen-verifier attack. 
 
(7) It cannot resist the smart-card-loss-attack 
 
Smart-card-loss-attack means an attacker can 
launch various attacks such as the off-line 
guessing attack if he/she obtains a legitimate 
user’s smart card [23]. In the login phase of 
Ramasamy and Muniyandi's scheme, the user 
keys in iID  and iPW . However, iID  and iPW  
are not verified by the smart card. Thus an 
adversary can try to guess the password 
arbitrarily if he obtains the card. Since the bit-
length of the password is always quite short, the 
password will be guessed quickly. Thus the 
scheme cannot resist the smart-card-loss-attack. 
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4. Our improved scheme 
 
In this section, we propose an improved scheme to 
enhance the security. The scheme comprises the 
registration phase, the login phase, the 
authentication phase, the key agreement phase 
and the password updating phase. The improved 
scheme is described in Section 4.1. Following, the 
security analysis and the performance comparison 
are discussed in Section 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. 
 
4.1 The improved scheme 
 
(1) The registration phase 
 
If a user wants to join the system, he should 
register himself to the authentication server. The 
steps of the registration phase are as follows. 
 
Step IR-1. }P,{: iii WIDASU 䋻 . 
 
The user iU first chooses his identity iID  and 
password iWP , and then submits }P,{ ii WID  to 
the authentication server AS in person or through a 
secure channel.  
 
Step IR-2. cardSmart:iUAS䋻 . 
 
Upon receiving }P,{ ii WID , AS computes S and 
R by:  
 
))(( Si xhIDhS                                                 (9) 
 
iPWSR                                                       (10) 
 
AS stores )}(,,{ hRS  in a smart card and sends it 
to the user.  Note that the server does not need to 
store user's password. 
 
(2) The login phase 
 
If iU  wants to access the system for services, the 
steps of the login phase are as follows. 
 
Step IL-1. The user keys in iID  and iPW .   
 
The user iU  attaches the smart card to a card 
reader and keys in iID  and iPW .  
Step IL-2. The smart card checks iPW . 
 
The smart card computes iPWRS  '  and 
checks whether S’ is equal to S. The steps are 
terminated if SS 䍴' .  
 
Step IL-3. },,,{: 21 Uii TCCIDASU 䊻 . 
 
If SS =' the smart card generates a random 
number r and computes },,,{ 21 CMAC  by: 
 
pSC r mod=1                                                    (11) 
 
)1mod()( -䎩 pSThA U                                    (12) 
 
pSM A mod=                                                    (13) 
 
pCMC A mod)(= 12                                           (14) 
 
Where UT  is the current timestamp. Next, the user 
sends },,,{ 21 Ui TCCID  along with the login request 
to the server. 
 
(3) The authentication phase 
 
On receiving the login request and },,,{ 21 Ui TCCID , 
the server checks the received information to 
authenticate the user by the following steps. 
 
Step IA-1. The server checks iID  and UT . 
 
The server checks the identity iID  and the 
timestamp UT . The authentication steps are 
stopped if iID  does not exist in the verification 
table or UT  is not fresh.  
 
Step IA-2. The server authenticates the user.  
 
If iID  and UT  are valid, the server computes 
))((=' Si xhIDhS 䎩  and )1mod()'(=' -䎩 pSThA U . 
Then the server verifies whether 1'12 )(
-ACC  and 
'AS are equal or not. If '1'12 )( AA SCC   , the server 
will authenticate the user.  
 
Step IA-3. },{: 3 Si TCUAS 䊻 .    
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After the user is authenticated, the server 
computes B and 3C  by 
 
)1mod()( -䎩 pSThB S                                    (15) 
 
pCC B mod13                                                 (16) 
 
Where ST  is the current timestamp. Next, the 
authentication server sends },{ 3 STC  to the user. 
 
Step IA-4. The user authenticates the server. 
 
After receiving },{ 3 STC , the user checks the 
freshness of the timestamp ST . If it is fresh then 
the smart card computes B’ and '3C  by. 
 
)1mod()(' -䎩 pSThB S                                    (17) 
 
pCC B mod' '13                                                (18) 
 
Finally, the smart card compares '3C  with 3C . The 
mutual authentication is obtained if 33 ' CC  . 
 
(4) The key agreement phase 
 
The server and the user will obtain a common 
session key SK if the mutual authentication is 
obtained. The common session key is negotiated 
by the server and the user with the following 
equation respectively. 
 
))(( STShhSK                                             (19) 
 
From now on, the server and the user can 
communicate securely by using the common 
session key SK. 
 
(5) The password updating phase  
 
The scheme provides users to choose and 
update passwords freely. Since the updating 
steps are only performed in the smart card, it is 
very convenient for users to change their 
password. The steps of the password updating 
phase are as follows. 
 
Step IU-1. The user attaches his smart card to a 
card reader and keys in his identity iID  and 
password iPW .  
Step IU-2. The smart card checks iPW . 
 
The smart card computes iPWRS  '  and 
checks whether S’ is equal to S or not. The 
password updating request is rejected if SS 䍴' .  
 
Step IU-3. The smart card replaces R with newR . 
 
If SS =' , the user selects and keys in a new 
password newiPW _ . The smart card computes 
newR  by 
 
newiinew PWPWRR _                              (20) 
 
Next, the smart card replaces R with newR . From 
now on, the user can use the new password to 
login to the system.  
 
4.2 Discussion and security analysis 
 
The improved scheme has the merits of providing 
mutual authentication and ensuring forward and 
backward secrecy. The users can choose and 
update passwords freely. The information stored in 
the authentication server database only includes 
the secret Sx  and user's identity iID , where Sx
can be protected with cryptographic mechanisms 
and iID  is public, thus the stolen-verifier attack can 
be avoided. 
 
Furthermore, the scheme can withstand lots of 
attacks such as the smart-card-loss-attack, the 
replay attack, the off-line guessing attack, the 
insider attack, the impersonation attack and the 
parallel session attack. The merits and security 
features are described as follows. 
 
(1) It withstands the smart-card-loss-attack 
 
Through the smart-card-loss-attack, if an 
unauthorized person obtains the legitimate user’s 
smart card, he can guess the password and 
impersonate the legitimate user to login to the 
system. The smart-card-loss-attack is caused by 
the smart card which always generates and 
outputs fixed information for the same input. The 
smart-card-loss-attack is always a huge threat for 
all cardholders. However, most of the smart card 
based schemes suffer from this attack. 
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In the login phase of the proposed scheme, the 
user sends },,,{ 21 Ui TCCID  to the authentication 
server, where riPWC =1  and pCMC
A mod)(= 12 . 
Due to the ever changing random number r, the 
transmitted information 1C  and 2C  are always 
updated on each login session. If an adversary 
obtains the smart card and tries to guess the 
password, the trial will fail due to the ever 
changed information makes the adversary 
cannot verify his guess. So the smart-card-loss-
attack can be avoided even if the adversary 
obtains the smart card. 
 
(2) It withstands the replay attack 
 
In the login phase, the user sends 
},,,{ 21 Ui TCCID  to the server for authentication. 
Since the information contains the timestamp UT , 
the replay message will be detected if the 
adversary retransmits the intercepted message. 
Similarly, if an adversary replays the message 
},{ 3 STC  to the user in Step IA-3, the user can 
also detect the attack by checking the freshness 
of the timestamp ST . So the proposed scheme 
resists the replay attack. 
 
(3) The proposed scheme provides forward and 
backward secrecy 
 
Though the session key is important secret 
information shared between the user and the 
server, but the session key may be disclosed in 
some scenario. Thus it is important to develop a 
system that a compromise of the current key 
should not compromise any future key or earlier 
key. In the proposed scheme, the common session 
key is computed by ))(( STShhSK  . Due to the 
ony way hash function, the hashed secret )(Sh  
cannot be disclosed even if the SK is 
compromised. Without knowing )(Sh , the future or 
the earlier session keys cannot be obtained. So it 
is infeasible to obtain any future key or earlier key 
even if the current session key is compromised. 
 
(4) The proposed scheme provides mutual 
authentication 
 
In a client-server system, it is important for a user 
authenticating himself to a server, and vice-versa. 
After mutual authentication, both parties are 
assured of the others' identity.  
 
In Step IA-2, upon receiving },,,{ 21 Ui TCCID , the 
server authenticates the user by checking whether 
'1'
12 )( AA SCC    holds. Similarly, in Step IA-4, the 
user authenticates the server if 33 ' CC   is verified. 
Thus, the proposed scheme provides mutual 
authentication that will enhance the security. 
 
(5) It resists the off-line guessing attack 
 
Suppose that an adversary wants to guess the 
password off-line by using the intercepted 
information },,,{ 21 Ui TCCID . Due to riPWC =1 , 
)( SThA U 䎩 , ASM   and )(= 12 ACMC , it is 
infeasible to find the password iPW  such that 
AA SCC =)( 112
- since it is a discrete logarithm 
problem. Thus, the improved scheme can resist 
the off-line guessing attack. 
 
(6) It resists the insider attack 
 
A malicious insider is a legitimate user whose 
actions are in contradiction to the system policy, or 
is a masquerader who owns a legitimate user's 
identity and impersonates another user for 
malicious purposes. In the improved scheme, the 
secret parameters S and R are stored in a tamper-
free smart card; no malicious insider can obtain the 
secrets even if he owns the card. Without knowing 
S and R, a malicious insider cannot compute 
correct 1C  and 2C  to impersonate a legitimate 
user to login the system. Suppose that the 
adversary owns a legitimate user's smart card. The 
probability for the malicious insider to correctly 
guess the password is PW2/1  which is very small, 
where PW  is the bit-length of the password. The 
system also can prevent the attack by limiting the 
error trial times. That is a malicious insider cannot 
fabricate false verification information to login to 
the system. Therefore, the scheme can resist the 
insider attack. 
 
(7) It resists the impersonation attack 
 
If an adversary wants to impersonate a legitimate 
user to login to the system, since the secret 
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parameters S and R are unknown, he cannot 
compute correct 1C  and 2C  to successfully login to 
the system. Similarly, the adversary cannot obtain 
B since S is unknown and )(= SThB S 䎩 ; therefore 
the adversary cannot compute correct 3C  with 
BCC 13 =  in Step IA-3 for authentication. So the 
improved scheme resists the impersonation attack. 
 
(8) It withstands the parallel session attack 
 
In the parallel session attack, an attacker can 
masquerade as the legitimate user by sending 
eavesdropped communication information between 
the user and the server. In the improved scheme, if 
an adversary intercepts the login or authentication 
information },,,{ 21 Ui TCCID  or },{ 3 STC  in previous 
session and resends it to the other party, the 
attack will be blocked since the verification steps in 
authentication phase will fail.  
 
4.3 Performance comparison 
 
The performance comparison of several ElGamal 
signature based password authentication schemes 
and our scheme are listed in Table 2. In the table, 
H means hash function and E stands for 
exponentiation operation. 
 
 
Hwang 
-Li 
[14] 
Awasthi 
-Lal 
[19] 
Kumar 
[8] 
Ramasamy-
Muniyandi 
[12] 
Our 
scheme
Registration 
phase 1E 
1H 
1E 2E 1E 1H 
Login phase 1H 3E 
2H 
3E 
1H 
3E 
1H 
2E 
1H 
3E 
Authentica-tion 
phase 
1H 
3E 
1H 
3E 
1H 
2E 
2H 
3E 
1H 
2E 
Mutual 
authentica-tion No No No No Yes 
 
Table 2. Comparison of several ElGamal  
signature based schemes and our scheme. 
 
Note that, in our improved scheme, the 
computation complexity does not include the 
authentication steps for the user to validate the 
server. It is shown that our scheme uses less 
computational resources than others, thus our 
scheme is more suitable to be used in a smart card 
based scenario. In practice, the smart card only 
needs to store S, R and a one way hash function 
h(·); so our scheme does not need large storage 
space in the smart card. Furthermore, our scheme 
also provides mutual authentication which is 
important on ensuring the security of remote 
authentication schemes.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we show that Ramasamy and 
Muniyandi's remote authentication scheme lacks 
key agreement mechanism and users cannot 
update their password freely. Moreover, their 
scheme cannot withstand the stolen-verifier attack, 
the off-line guessing attack and the smart-card-
loss-attack; and it is not a practical solution for 
remote accessing. We propose an improved 
scheme to fix the flaws. The improved scheme has 
the following merits: 
 
(1) The scheme provides mutual authentication 
and key agreement. 
 
(2) The scheme ensures forward and backward 
secrecy. 
 
(3) The users can choose and update their 
passwords freely. 
 
(4) The improved scheme withstands lots of 
attacks such as the smart-card-loss-attack, the 
replay attack, the off-line guessing attack, the 
insider attack, the impersonation attack and the 
parallel session attack. 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
This work was partially supported by the National 
Science Council of the Republic of China under the 
contract number NSC 101-2632-E-274-001-MY3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ImprovementoftheElGamalBasedRemoteAuthenticationSchemeUsingSmartCards, YungͲChengLeeetal./1063Ͳ1072
Vol.12,December20141072
References 
 
[1] C. C. Chang and T. C. Wu, “Remote password 
authentication with smart cards,” IEE Proc E- Comput 
Digit Tech, vol. 138, no. 3, pp. 165-168, 1991. 
 
[2] B. T. Hsieh et al., “On the security of some password 
authentication protocols,” Informatica, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 
195-204, 2003. 
 
[3] M. S. Hwang and L. H. Li, “A new remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards,” IEEE T 
Consum Electr, vol. 1, no. 46, pp. 28-30, 2000. 
 
[4] C. W. Lin et al., “A new strong password 
authentication scheme using oneǦway hash functions,” J 
Comput Sys Sc Int, vol. 45, no. 4, pp.623-626, 2006. 
 
[5] X. Tian et al., “Improved efficient remote user 
authentication schemes,” Int J  Net Sec, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 
149-154, 2007. 
 
[6].W. H. Yang and S. P. Shieh, “Password 
authentication schemes with smart card,” COMPSEC, 
vol. 8, no. 18, pp. 727-733, 1999. 
 
[7] E. J. Yoon et al., “Further improvement of an efficient 
password based remote user authentication scheme 
using smart cards,” IEEE T Consum Electr, vol. 50, no. 
2, pp. 612-614, 2004. 
 
[8] R. Martínez-Peláez et al., “Security improvement of 
two dynamic ID-based authentication schemes by Sood-
Sarje-Singh,” J Appl Res Technol, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 
755-763, Oct. 2013. 
 
[9] M. Kumar, “Some remarks on a remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards with forward 
secrecy," IEEE T Consum Electr, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 615-
618, 2004. 
 
[10] H. Y. Chien et al., “An efficient and practical solution 
to remote authentication: smart card,” COMPSEC, vol. 4, 
no. 21, pp. 372-375, 2002. 
 
[11] H. C. Hsiang and W. K. Shih, “Weaknesses and 
improvements of the Yoon-Ryu-Yoo remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards,” Comput 
Commun, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 649-652, 2009. 
 
[12] W. C. Ku and S. M. Chen, “Weaknesses and 
improvements of an efficient password based remote 
user authentication scheme using smart cards,” IEEE T 
Consum Electr, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 204-207, 2004. 
 
 
[13] R. Ramasamy, A. P. Muniyandi, “New remote 
mutual authentication scheme using smart cards,” T data 
privacy, vol. 2, pp. 141-152, 2009. 
 
[14] L. Lamport, “Password authentication with insecure 
communication,” Commun ACM, vol. 24, no. 11, pp. 
770-772, 1981. 
 
[15] M. S. Hwang and L. H. Li, “A new remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards,” IEEE T 
Consum Electr, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 28-30, 2000. 
 
[16] T. ElGamal,  “A public key cryptosystem and a 
signature scheme based on discrete logarithms,”  IEEE 
T Inform Theory,  vol. 31,  no. 4,  pp. 469-472, 1985. 
 
[17] C. K. Chan and L. M. Cheng, “Cryptanalysis of a 
remote user authentication scheme using smart cards,” 
IEEE T Consum Electr, vol. 46, pp. 992-993, 2000. 
 
[18],J. J. Shen et al., “A modified remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards,” IEEE T 
Consum Electr, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 414-416, 2003. 
 
[19] K. C. Leung et al., “Cryptanalysis of a remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards”, IEEE T 
Consum Electr, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 1243-1245, 2003. 
 
[20] A. K. Awasthi and S. Lal, “A remote user 
authentication scheme using smarts cards with forward 
secrecy,” IEEE T Consum Electr, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 
1246-1248, 2003. 
 
[21].E. J. Yoon et al., “Efficient remote user 
authentication scheme based on generalized ElGamal 
signature scheme,” IEEE T Consum Electr, vol. 50, no. 
2, pp. 568-570, 2004. 
 
[22] X. Tian et al., “Improved efficient remote user 
authentication schemes,” Int J Net Sec, vol.4, no.2, 
pp.149-154, 2007. 
 
[23] Y. C. Lee, “Smart - card - loss - attack and 
improvement of Hsiang et al.’s authentication scheme,” J 
Appl Res Technol, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 597-603, Aug. 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


